Is God Real? 

Are there good reasons to believe? 

Whether asked in doubt, curiosity, grief, or wonder, the question ‘Is God Real?’ keeps returning. 

It’s never a purely abstract question. It surfaces in quiet moments, conversations with friends and in the midst of encountering suffering or beauty. It’s a question that matters, and is one to take seriously.  

In a crowded online space full of strong opinions and quick dismissals, it’s easy to assume that belief in God requires a kind of blind faith. This article aims to take a different approach. Rather than chasing a single definitive proof, this article approaches the question from another angle: not whether God can be proven beyond doubt, but whether there are good reasons to think that God is real.  

The existence of God – 3 core questions 

To explore the question, we’ll look at three of the most influential families of arguments in philosophy of religion; the cosmological, teleological and moral arguments. Each of these arguments represent vast areas of study – indeed I refer to them as argument ‘families’, as under each heading there exist multiple distinct strands of argument. This article will serve as an introduction to the key ideas rather than an exhaustive treatment. Each argument on its own might not settle the debate, but taken together they form a cumulative case for the existence of God.  

These arguments were not designed to prove that Christianity is true. Several of their authors would resist that conclusion. However, if we are asking whether the universe bears marks of the God that Christianity describes, then they are a very reasonable place to start looking.  

Can you prove it? – The Cosmological Argument 

The cosmological argument does justice to the intuition that something doesn’t come from nothing. The fact that the universe is in existence and in motion needs an explanation outside of itself. Philosopher Aristotle observed that things are in motion, and there is a causal relationship between them. One thing does not move without being caused to move by another. Imagine a row of dominoes: one does not fall without being knocked by another. This cannot go on infinitely; there must have been something that set the whole thing in motion and which itself was not put into motion by any other thing.  

13th Century philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas developed the argument further, exploring not just motion but change. Everything changing must have been changed by something else. There must therefore be a first cause of all the change we witness around us, itself unchanging. God fits these definitions as both unmoved mover and uncaused cause.  

Philosopher William Lane Craig is the most well-known modern proponent of the Kālām cosmological argument[1]. Having its origins in the medieval period with thinkers such as Al-Ghazali, Craig is widely credited with reviving and reformulating it with reference to contemporary cosmology. 

This version focusses particularly on the idea that the universe had a beginning. Everything that begins to exist has a cause. If the universe began to exist then the universe must therefore have a cause for its existence. Craig’s argument draws on empirical evidence for the universe’s expansion, mathematical logic and intuition, arguing that this lines up with our everyday experience.  

The Cosmological doesn’t tell us exactly what kind of being this unmoved mover is, but it establishes that the universe was brought into existence by something outside of itself, a significant first step in our cumulative case. Craig holds that the cause of the universe must be immaterial, since it precedes matter. It must be enormously powerful, since it produced everything from nothing. And it must be intelligent, since it brought a finely ordered universe into being.  

What is the Teleological Argument?  

Another argument is the fine-tuning argument. The thrust of the argument is that the universe is ordered in such a way that an intelligent creator is far more likely than the alternative hypothesis that the universe has randomness at its core. This is not a knock-down proof, but it is instead a question of coherence and likelihood.  

English Clergyman, William Paley, famously proposed the ‘watchmaker’ analogy in his 1802 work, Natural Theology; or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity[2]. No one, looking at a watch, would doubt that it was designed by a skilful watchmaker. Likewise, the intricate order of the universe suggests the hand of a designer. Paley’s argument rests on analogy, the universe resembles a designed object, therefore it is reasonable to assume there is one  

While sharing Paley’s theistic conclusion, the modern fine-tuning argument operates from a different logical footing. It does not ask whether the universe looks designed. It asks instead which hypothesis – theism or naturalism – better explains a specific body of empirical evidence.  

Contemporary philosopher, Robin Collins argued in his influential 2009 paper that fine-tuning evidence falls into three categories: laws of nature, constants of physics, and the initial conditions of the universe. 

Collins highlights that if any one of these parameters were to differ, even slightly, the universe would have been inhospitable to life. 

His argument is that the evidence of a finely tuned, life-permitting universe strongly supports the theistic hypothesis of an omniscient everlasting creator existing outside of the universe, rather than a naturalistic hypothesis.[3]  

We will consider one example from each category. If even one of the five fundamental laws of nature did not exist, such as the strong nuclear force that binds protons and neutrons together in every cell, complex life could not arise. Within constants of physics, if the gravitational constant differed by approximately one part in 1060 then “the universe would have either exploded too quickly for galaxies and stars to form, or collapsed back on itself too quickly for life to evolve”[4]. As for initial conditions, mathematical physicist Sir Roger Penrose argues that the initial distribution of matter and energy in the universe had to be almost perfectly ordered for life to form at all[5].

The range of possible beginnings that would produce a universe such as ours is, as Collins illustrates, smaller than the chance of hitting a single proton by throwing a dart at a dartboard the size of the entire visible universe. 

Given the intricacy of the universe, it is more likely that a being like God created it, than it being a product of chance. The main naturalistic objection to this conclusion comes in the form of the multiverse hypothesis. This is the suggestion that our universe is simply one of an enormous number of universes with varying physical parameters, thus making a life-permitting one statistically unsurprising. Philosophers such as Collins have however, raised serious challenges to this response, questioning both its evidential basis and whether it genuinely escapes the explanatory problem it sets out to solve.  Rather than resolving the issue, they argue, it may simply ‘kick the problem upstairs’ by positing a multiverse that is itself in need of fine-tuning. Much more could be said on this point, what is offered here is an introduction to the main shape of the arguments.  

What is the Moral argument? 

Moral arguments propose that morality is best explained by the existence of God. There are two stages: first, arguing that morality is in some sense objective; second, showing why God is the most plausible explanation.  

Is morality objective? Ethicist David Enoch sets out a useful test in his 2014 paper, ‘Why I’m an Objectivist about Ethics (And Why You Are, Too)'[6]. If we all held different beliefs about a topic, would the truth of the matter change? Fashion follows consensus – if everyone believed that wearing a long white dress to a wedding was correct, would it be? It appears that, yes, that would be the right thing to wear. However, if we all believed that the sun revolved around the earth, would make that belief, correct? No, there is something objective about the motions of the solar system that transcends public consensus. 

Consider morality; if we all believed that torturing an innocent person for fun is permissible, would it be? Most people would say no. This suggests that moral beliefs are independent of the general consensus. 

A second reason is the implicit universality of ethical commitments. When I say ‘torturing an innocent person for fun is wrong’ I mean that it is wrong for all people, in all times and in all places. I am not merely suggesting that it is contrary to my culture’s preferences.  

Thirdly, without something objective to morality, it is hard to understand moral progress. Abolitionist William Wilberforce went against cultural consensus in the early 19th Century and fought to abolish the transatlantic slave trade. If morality is simply a matter of consensus, it is hard to see how a counter-cultural reformer could be doing the right thing. Objective morality makes sense of moral heroes, which in turn allows us to make sense of moral reformers. Enoch’s point is that while someone can always bite the bullet simply accepting that slavery would have been morally permissible if everyone endorsed it, most people find they genuinely cannot, and that inability reveals something important: that they are already, implicitly, committed to the objectivity of morality. 

Does objective morality make more sense if God exists? Eighteenth century philosopher, Immanuel Kant recognised that moral life is somewhat undermined if there is no God and no afterlife[7]. Choosing to do the right thing often costs us; a whistleblower loses the opportunity for promotion, someone in crippling debt hands in a wallet full of cash they find even though keeping it would have allowed them to pay off their debts. Kant’s argument is that moral life makes full sense if there is a God and an afterlife which will ultimately unite moral obligation and personal flourishing.  

Contemporary philosopher, Sharon Street would push back against the idea of objective moral beliefs. She argues that if we have come to hold or beliefs through a process of evolution, then our moral understanding would be shaped by survival, not by truth[8] It would be a major coincidence if we came to hold moral beliefs that were actually true.  

If, however, God exists, then the moral beliefs that we hold wouldn’t be a matter of chance. God could guide human development in such a way that moral intuitions largely align with objective moral truths. 

Classical theism explains our seemingly objective moral beliefs by grounding them in a perfectly good and loving God who wills that we can know and live by moral truth. 

Conclusion 

God is not only a topic for philosophical reflection; he is personal and relational. In the person of Jesus, he reveals himself most fully: the invisible creator of the cosmos who took on human flesh and walked among us.  

The cosmological, teleological and moral arguments each point, from a different direction, toward a being beyond the universe. A cause, a designer, a moral grounding. These arguments were developed across centuries and traditions. In the Christian story, each of these arguments will echo a characteristic of God that we can see in Jesus and learn about through history. The Christian claim is that this God, whose power the cosmological argument highlights, whose intelligence the teleological argument explores, and whose goodness the moral argument demands, did not remain at a distance. He made himself fully known to us in Jesus.  

If some of these arguments have given you reason to think belief in God may be reasonable, why not read one of the eyewitness accounts of Jesus’ life?  

“The Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us. We have seen his glory, the glory of the one and only Son, who came from the Father, full of grace and truth” – John 1:14 

References 

1. William Lane Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz, Eugene, Oregon:  Wipf & Stock Publishers, (2011) 
2. William Paley, Natural Theology: or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, Collected from the Appearances of Nature, ed. Matthew D. Eddy and David Knight, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2006) 
3. Robin Collins, ‘The Teleological Argument: An Exploration of the Fine‑Tuning of the Universe’, in William Lane Craig & J. P. Moreland, The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 202–281, (2012) 
4. Ibid, p.215 
5. Roger Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics, New York: Oxford University Press, (1989) 
6. David Enoch, ‘Why I Am an Objectivist About Ethics (and Why You Are, Too)’, in The Ethical Life, ed. Russ Shafer Landau, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2014) 
7. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1788), trans. Mary Gregor, Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2015) 
8. Sharon Street, ‘A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value’, Philosophical Studies 127, no. 1 (2006).